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Abstract. In this article we explore the decent work standard developed by Rich-
ard Heeks for digital online labour markets and use a review of empirical research 
about ride-hailing to adapt this framework to the location-based service delivery 
market. The framework is then tested against an in-depth analysis of informality 
and precarity in the ride hailing sector in Cali, Colombia.  Findings show that 
location-based platform workers in Cali lack many decent work protections.  
However, the case study also demonstrates that workers are evolving creative 
ways to grapple with specific aspects of precarity within the ride-hailing sector. 
Based on this analysis, we argue that policy analysis and worker innovations need 
to ‘meet in the middle’ rather than follow policy recommendations emanating 
from other jurisdictions. We suggest some specific policy reforms that will be 
appropriate to the Colombian and Latin American context. 
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1 Introduction 
The digital platform economy is rapidly reorganizing the activities of businesses, work-
ers and consumers alike, and policy makers are often forced to introduce policy solu-
tions before the full implications of new business models are realized and understood. 
In particular, the platform economy offers greater flexibility to workers, and the possi-
bility to ‘be your own boss.’  However, this informality may worsen or introduce new 
forms of precarity among workers in ways that are not currently well understood.  In-
deed, the platform economy challenges definitions of informality and precarity and 
therefore renders standard policy responses obsolete. Meanwhile, if policy interven-
tions are to be successful, policy makers need to take into consideration workers’ ad-
aptations to their rapidly changing context. 
 
With this in mind, this paper applies Heeks’ [19] decent work standard for platform 
labour to the ride hailing sector in Cali Colombia.  Since Heeks’ standard was designed 
for online platform labour, we use a literature review to adapt it to the ‘location-based 
service delivery’ market, paying particular attention to the ride-hailing sector, which 
includes Uber, Lyft, 99Taxis or Easy Taxi. The framework is then used to assess infor-
mality and precarity in the ride hailing sector in Cali, Colombia.  Results show that 
workers are developing creative solutions to address precarity or improve opportunity 
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within the ride-hailing sector.  We suggest how Colombian and Latin American policy 
can take these findings into account to produce appropriate regulatory frameworks. 
2 Emerging Decent Work Standards for the Digital Economy 
The International Labour Organization (ILO) defines decent work as “opportunities for 
work that is productive and delivers a fair income, security in the workplace and social 
protection for families, better prospects for personal development and social integra-
tion, freedom for people to express their concerns, organize and participate in the deci-
sions that affect their lives and equality of opportunity and treatment for all women and 
men” [26].  The decent work standard offers a way to assess whether labour arrange-
ments are ‘empowering’ to workers, and by extension whether the platform economy 
offers the possibility of empowerment to workers [43].  
 
The platform economy is theorized to offer unequal levels of opportunity to workers 
[25 p. 18] and it has the potential to create new patterns of exclusion and precarity [34].  
We need frameworks to evaluate the impacts on workers, and to provide guidance to 
policy-makers. 
 
Heeks [19] addresses this gap with his ‘Decent Work in the Digital Economy’ guide-
lines. The framework is based on a review of empirical studies of crowd work plat-
forms. Ride-hailing and related services such as food delivery have different dynamics, 
since they are geographically constrained [14 p. 32]. So, Heeks’ model must be adapted 
to the location-based service delivery market. 
 
Heeks found that potential benefits from crowd work include access to employment 
opportunities, unbiased or objective inclusion in labour markets, reasonable earnings 
(often higher than workers would otherwise earn), career development opportunities, 
greater flexibility, and in some cases reduced costs [19 p. 10].   
 
Ride hailing studies corroborate Heeks’ findings about flexibility [32; 18 p. 11], ac-
cess to employment opportunities [28], and overcoming access barriers that exist in 
established taxi industries [18 p. 6].  This suggests that ride-hailing apps empower 
workers to be independent contractors. An analysis of the Mexican case found that Uber 
drivers can earn significantly higher salaries than traditional taxi drivers depending on 
hours worked, contributions to social security, and patterns of vehicle ownership.1 In-
formal taxi work can be made less precarious through the introduction of ride-hailing 
apps [34 p. 386]. Finally, ride sharing services have been shown to make more efficient 
use of automobile resources than traditional taxis [8]. 
 
Location-based work is not associated, however, with career development opportu-
nities except as it allows workers to take time away from other full time work until 
something better comes along, or they complete studies [18 p. 12]. Nor does location-
based work reduce the costs of work, however it may be used to supplement income or 
                                                          
1 https://ingresopasivointeligente.com/cuanto-gana-un-chofer-de-uber-en-mexico/ 
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offset the costs of household expenses such as car maintenance.  
 
Heeks organized key challenges according to the ILO’s 2013 decent work scheme: 
1) working conditions, 2) the employment situation which includes things like the avail-
ability of jobs or the possibility for career development, and 3) the overall employment 
context including laws and policies, or the possibility for collective bargaining.  
 
Working conditions for crowd workers revolve around whether a platform environ-
ment enables to them ‘win’ contracts and complete tasks for fair compensation.  Based 
on this, Heeks divides working conditions into four key issues: the adequacy of com-
pensation, work processes, working hours, and health and safety.   
 
As with crowdworkers, ride hailing workers express concerns about the costs of ride 
hailing. Compensation may be inadequate to cover costs [50 p. 6] such as driving to 
pick-up locations, waiting for customers, car insurance, car maintenance or deprecia-
tion, as well as cell service [34 p. 387].   
 
The notion of work processes marks a departure from existing ILO decent work 
standards, which previously spoke of productive work. Platforms position workers as 
independent contractors, and the idea of “decent work processes” directs our attention 
to the need for fair conditions in which to operate an independent business. In the ride-
hailing space drivers complain about the lack of transparency in how computer algo-
rithms assign rides, which makes it difficult to plan business practices [32; 47 p. 3775].  
Also, surge pricing obliges drivers to work at peak times of day in order to earn the 
highest incomes [51 p. 11; 50 p. 6; 34 p. 392] which takes away their autonomy.  
 
Finally, regarding health and safety, studies suggest that workers would need to drive 
long days to earn a basic income, leading to fatigue [47 p. 3768]. Drivers may also 
experience feelings of isolation [50 p. 6], or drive late at night or in unsafe neighbor-
hoods [34 p. 384). 
 
The nature of employment concerns employment status, access to employment op-
portunities, stability and security of work, the potential for career development, dis-
crimination, and dignity or respect at work.   
 
Employment status is key to understanding decent working conditions in the ride-
hailing sector. While ride hailing platforms legally designate drivers as independent 
contractors, they set up information systems that treat them like employees [20] or ‘de-
pendent contractors’ [41]. Also, since many workers in the global south lack the basic 
language, skills and infrastructure to take these jobs, they are often subcontracted by 
middle managers or fleet operators [28; 30 p. 46-47; 16; 45 p. 169].  Also, the security 
and stability of ride-hailing work is heavily dependent on the algorithms used to organ-
ize the system.  Drivers are vulnerable to sudden changes in service offerings, pricing 
or algorithms, including ratings systems [46]. 
 
Career development opportunities are a major consideration in the crowdworking 
space, but are less relevant in the ride-hailing space. In contrast, discrimination and 
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dignity are significant issues in the ride-hailing space. Hua and Ray [23] find that ride-
hailing features racialized and gendered patterns of work, and authors report on dis-
crimination both through ride-hailing apps [46] and in person [17].  
 
A third category of issues concerns the overall context for employment, including 
availability of social protections, possibilities for collective bargaining, access to plat-
form governance, and accountability and legal frameworks.  
 
The lack of social protections for drivers is widely discussed, in particular the fact 
non-employees may lack access to minimum wage, overtime pay, unemployment in-
surance, health protections and benefits, rights to collective bargaining [31; 50 p. 6; 34 
p. 385].  However, it is important to note that effective social protections are often non-
existent for large segments of the working poor in developing countries. In this context, 
the question if often more what can be gained from ride-hailing, rather than what is lost.  
 
There is also a general power and information asymmetry between workers and plat-
form owners in the platform economy [47 p. 3761-71], which is made worse by the fact 
that labour market flexibility downloads risk and insecurity from firms onto workers 
[34 p. 385).  Meanwhile, drivers face challenges with collective bargaining since the 
network is designed to connect them with gigs, but not each other [2, p. 12]. However, 
there are many examples of workers organizing to protect their rights, and online dis-
cussions about how to do so productively [5]. 
 
Overall, Heeks highlights the significance of work processes to labour relations in 
the platform economy, with implications for levels of worker autonomy, opportunities 
for worker creativity and entrepreneurialism, and the human rights of workers with re-
gards to surveillance, data ownership and a host of related issues.  This issues is com-
mon to all workers in the platform economy. 
 
However, because ride-hailing is localized there are some significant differences in 
in this sector. Health and safety issues are considerably more important to drivers than 
crowd workers.  The barriers to employment are also very different, including access 
to an automobile. Training is less likely to work as a way to empower workers in this 
sector of the economy. Finally, because drivers are so directly dependent on their plat-
form system for connecting with customers, knowledge about those work systems, or 
control over data about public transport, is essential to the empowerment of localized 
workers, and their ability to make companies accountable. 
 
Based on this, many policies for decent work in the platform economy could apply 
across the labor spectrum, such as provision of leave and minimum salary.  Others 
would need to cater to a particular sector.  For example, specific health and safety 
guidelines are necessary for drivers, but would be far less relevant to crowd workers. 
Similarly, training may not be as necessary in the ride-hailing space, and could be re-
placed with regulations for the onboarding of new workers, but is a significant concern 
for crowd workers. Finally, the two largest concerns for localized platform workers are 
the possibility and right to operate with some measure of autonomy within a highly-
automated system, as well as the right to form collectives to organize their work and 
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defend their rights. 
3 Decent work standards and Ride Hailing in Cali, Colombia 
In Cali, Colombia labor informality exceeds 48% of the population so ride hailing 
offers an important labor outlet. Even though it is deemed illegal by authorities, it is 
embraced by workers, and protests against the sector have not arisen.  This situation 
has the potential to generate greater precarity among taxi drivers, so analysis of their 
situation is merited.  This section evaluates the choices and circumstances of workers 
in Cali against the standards proposed by Heeks on the basis of empirical research car-
ried out by Lozano-Paredes in spring 2018.  This included a survey of ride-hailing 
workers (sample of 200, confidence 95%, margin of error 3.87%, variability 5%), and 
5 in-depth interviews. 
 
When surveyed about their motivation for taking up ride-hailing, workers indicated 
that the platform economy offered a quick way to earn extra income (46%), or that they 
did not find another option (33%). Interviews clarified that this career path requires few 
qualifications, has a low level of capital risk since the driver maintains ownership of 
the main business asset (the vehicle), there is no need to pay an association fee, and 
there is little supervision, so drivers can meet their personal goals on their own sched-
ule. In interviews drivers indicted that ride-hailing offers a means to fulfill immediate 
economic need, and that they wanted to gain as much as they could in the sector while 
it was still possible, before legislation was introduced. 
 
On the theme of working conditions, 79% of surveyed workers indicated that earning 
justified continuing to engage in ride-hailing.  The Colombia minimum wage is COP 
781 242 per month, (USD 270) and the average take home earnings for platform work-
ers after expenses, is COP 2 300 000 per month (USD 767). Meanwhile, a poll of taxi 
drivers conducted by the National Federation of Merchants [13], for the city of Bogotá 
D.C., determined that, on average, taxi drivers have a monthly income of COP 1 725 
000, (USD 575) after paying for expenses such as the rental of the vehicle, maintenance, 
which are on average COP 363 200 (USD 121) per month.  Only 3% of surveyed work-
ers reported valuing flexibility as a key motivator for ride-hailing, though flexibility 
was emphasized more strongly during interviews.   
However ride-hailing workers do not comply with national working time directives. 
In July 2017, the Colombian Labor Code increased the working day from 8 to 10 hours. 
This allowed employers to schedule 10 hour shifts without exceeding 48 hours per 
week. However, interviewees reported working an average of 60 hours per week.   
Finally, regarding health and safety, drivers need only comply with the minimum 
standards for car circulation. Colombia has mandatory insurance for car accidents 
called the Seguro Obligatorio de Accidentes de Tránsito (SOAT).  This is a requirement 
for driving in general, and not specific to platform work.  It is included in the cost of a 
car, and is amortized over the life of the car by ride hailing workers. 
On the topic of employment conditions, there did not appear to be any barriers to 
6 
working in the ride hailing sector, and both Uber and Cabify offer training opportuni-
ties, including a course in mobile-use for all participating drivers. This is not the case 
with the local application, WayCali. At the current time, training is business driven, 
rather than government mandated.  Also, both Uber and Cabify offer workers access to 
a portable work history, reputation ratings and weekly earnings. However this data is 
not interoperable between the different platforms (no data portability).   
All platforms have company policies guaranteeing anti-discrimination and data pro-
tection together with privacy for clients and workers.  Colombian regulation lags behind 
the corporate sector in this regard, and even binding regulation regarding data protec-
tion [33] has not been applied to Transportation Network Companies.  However, there 
is no space to resolve disputes between workers, platforms and clients. 
Dignity and respect at work are difficult to evaluate.  There are not currently any 
regulations in Colombia addressing this issues, but surveyed drivers did indicate that 
their expectations were fulfilled by working with ride-hailing platforms (64.7 indicated 
they were substantially, and 35.3% indicated they were entirely fulfilled). Workers did 
not express complaints regarding poor treatment by clients, and the perception is that 
platforms offer a good work environment. It may be that workers expect nothing more 
than a well-performing platform that allows them to turn a profit. In Cali, workers value 
the autonomy, flexibility and independence offered by ride-hailing, and their percep-
tions are shaped by this context. 
Finally, regarding the employment context, contributions to social security are vol-
untary in Cali, and only 8% of surveyed ride-hailing workers made contributions to 
insurance, sick and/or maternity leave, or a pension plan. Another 45% reported con-
tributions from previous work. Non-contribution is especially low among those at the 
beginning of their professional life (88.2%) and close retirement (50%). Younger work-
ers do not feel a need to invest in social security, while older workers feel it is too late.  
Drivers reported that they would prefer not to pay social security, as it cut into their 
income. Indeed, they saw future formalization of the sector as a threat, and saw the 
ability to avoid taxes as a benefit of informal work.  This reflects findings for the full 
labour market in Colombia [27]. 
Colombian regulation does not offer a categorization for platform works, however 
platform drivers could possibly be qualified as self-employed “independent workers.” 
This might put them under the Occupational Hazard System, which says that contrac-
tors who take on employees for more than a month must contribute to the General Sys-
tem of Labor Risks, however this practice is not currently in effect.   
 
Finally, Colombian legal frameworks do not currently contemplate collective nego-
tiation and collective communication between independent workers, and Colombia cur-
rently does not offer a national law regarding platform workers’ rights.  The debate on 
this subject is currently open and ongoing. This means that drivers within the ride hail-
ing systems currently do not have access to their metadata or any kind of consumer 
digital asset management or quality control.  Meanwhile, since platforms and platform 
work are technically illegal in Colombia, there are no grounds for companies such as 
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Cabify, WayCali or Uber to share their data with national, regional or local govern-
ments.  
 
This evaluation shows that Colombian regulations fall well short of the decent work 
standards for the platform economy. Currently, in the absence of regulations, businesses 
fulfil some of the standards suggested by Heeks, and workers are not necessarily de-
manding changes.  But the situation does put workers at risk of precarity.  The research 
also shows that there is considerable diversity between workers, with motivations rang-
ing from supplemental income, to entrepreneurial activity [24 pg. 37-38 and 64], to 
informal labour, and it is important to ensure that decent work standards take this into 
consideration. 
4 Entrepreneurialism by Workers in the Ride Hailing Sector 
It would be tempting to suggest that policy interventions in Colombia simply fill in 
the gap between existing conditions and global standards. However, local context needs 
to be taken into account if policy development, implementation and uptake is to be 
successful.  This section takes a larger look at the ride-hailing sector in Cali, Colombia 
based on the above mentioned interviews plus ethnographic work carried out by 
Lozano-Paredes in spring 2018. 
This research showed that there is considerable entrepreneurial activity within the 
ride hailing sector in Cali. In particular, two groups of drivers have emerged that use 
WhatsApp to build local ride hailing “platforms.” One group has about 300 drivers and 
the other 50. Drivers use these platforms to supplement their work during off peak times 
for the big platform companies, and, also to address some of the forms of precarity they 
experience in the ride hailing space.  
The groups were created by enterprising ride-hailing drivers. Workers pay a monthly 
fee to join a dispatch group, which simply delivers dispatches. It neither offers nor de-
mands verification of driver data, there is no need for compliance with mechanical tech-
nical norms, there is no accident insurance, nor contributions to social security.   
 
A second WhatsApp group is available to customers where they can post pickup 
requests.  The customer group grows through referrals as well as previous ratings in 
established platforms such as Uber. This group also includes intermediaries such as 
security guards and doormen at apartments, hotels and clubs who post requests on pas-
senger’s behalf. Administrators pick up these requests and send them out to drivers 
through the dispatch channel. Intermediaries are paid COP 1 000 (USD 0.35) for each 
ride contracted or COP 75 000 (USD 27) for every 50 services contracted.  If the service 
is to the airport, the payment goes up to COP 5 000 (USD 1.77) per ride.   
 
As these services have evolved, the larger group has adopted the Zello walkie-talkie 
app for dispatch, and it has come to be known as Los Sellos. Through this free applica-
tion groups of up to 2,500 drivers can sustain communication with each other. To access 
the Zello service drivers must pay a onetime membership fee of COP 100 000 (USD 
35) and a monthly membership fee of COP 40 000 (USD 15).  Passengers still post their 
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requests to the WhatsApp group, but dispatch becomes more fluid.   
The cost of a ride is calculated using a free application called Blumeter. Blumeter is 
an application that allows users to manage rides made outside of the Uber platform.  
Pricing can reflect Uber’s rates, or it can be customized by the driver.  
Over time, organizers have introduced groups for local neighborhoods and subburbs. 
They have also introduced an inter-city service between Cali and Popayán (140 kms 
away) and  Buenaventura 120km).  Requests are received on the main network, and the 
administrator forwards them to the administrator of the area or route network, who as-
signs the fare to a driver. The intercity routes are also used for packages. 
One of the main reasons these emergent WhatsApp networks are successful, is that 
Uber, Cabify and WayCali face significant challenges with payments collections in 
Cali. The cost of using a credit card is very high in Colombia, which means that cus-
tomers are unlikely to use their credit card for small transactions, such as a $1 taxi ride.  
They would much rather pay in cash.  In order to accommodate this, the big platform 
companies have devised cash payment schemes.  Each time a driver takes a cash pay-
ment, they incur a debt to the platform for the cost of the commission. The next time 
that a passenger uses a credit card to pay, this debt is paid down.   
 
This creates an incentive for drivers to avoid customers who use credit cards, as well 
as an incentive to leave the platform if their commission debt becomes too large.  Since 
there is no shared information system between platforms, and no credit history for driv-
ers, drivers can do this with impunity.  In addition, drivers can avoid the commissions 
charged by big platform companies all together if they connect more directly with cus-
tomers.  Altogether, there is a massive incentive for more localized platforms in cities 
like Cali, and they produce a win-win situation for drivers and customers, who get the 
same level of service, but at a lower cost to customers and a higher salary for workers. 
  
In these networks, the passengers, drivers and owners of vehicles know that they are 
immersed in a scheme that offers few guarantees or protections. For example, there is 
no support for accidents whatsoever.  This risk is apparently already calculated by the 
workers, who report that it is a risk worth taking.  They gain higher income this way, 
and also avoid some of the pitfalls of working with platform companies, such as prob-
lems with rate settlement and poor complaint mechanisms between drivers and plat-
forms.   
 
Drivers see these schemes as a means to achieve personal gain, and to grow a mico-
business by acquiring more vehicles, and these forms of entrepreneurialism should not 
be quashed.  These emergent driver-run platforms are more informal than more estab-
lished platforms like Uber or Cabify.  However, through these schemes, workers are 
finding creative ways to improve their working conditions. For example, drivers, espe-
cially female drivers, enjoy the security of knowing that passengers have been vetted 
by trusted community members such as security guards posted at known buildings. And 
also, local collaborations can help drivers connect with fares during ‘dead hours’ when 
markets are saturated, thereby improving their income.  In addition, these local systems 
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allow drivers to enhance their service offering through delivery of packages, or car-
pooling.  And of course, these systems reduce the commissions that are paid to foreign 
firms or local platform companies, which is one of the surest way of putting money in 
the pockets of low-income earners. 
5 Drawing Conclusions 
In the Colombian context, labor regulations were designed for a radically different labor 
model, and do not guarantee decent conditions for platform workers. From the point of 
view of current regulations, the majority of platform workers in Colombia would be 
considered autonomous workers. Colombian legislation for autonomous workers is 
clearly insufficient to ensure adequate protections. In particular, the social security sys-
tem was designed for salaried work, suggesting that Colombia requires new flexible 
forms of social security. 
 
Based on the research presented here, Colombia should consider a new statute of 
autonomous and decent digital work, which lays out clear obligations for the companies 
involved, and offers new ways to extend the benefits currently enjoyed by those who 
have salaried work to workers in more flexible jobs. However, overregulation that re-
duces or destroys the incentives that produce innovations in cities like Cali should be 
avoided. In total, new regulation should seek to achieve a minimum from which no one 
can be lowered, but not a maximum which no one can reach. 
 
The standards for decent work in the platform economy presented in this paper offer 
a useful starting point.  But in consideration of case study results, they need to be 
adapted for the Colombian context. They should provide certain clear minimums for 
drivers, such as regulations for accident and liability insurance.  But they should not 
establish maximum’s which no one can reach, such as the requirement that all drivers 
be made formal employees.  The concept of "precariousness" and “informality” in Co-
lombia should be revised to 1) recognize as formal those who have temporary or partial 
contracts and invoice a minimum amount per month, and 2) grant space to workers who 
voluntarily choose to categorize themselves as entrepreneurs.  Rules such as mandatory 
pension contributions need to be treated with care, because they can place a heavy bur-
den on informal workers as well as spaces of innovation.  Similarly, the right to nego-
tiate collective agreements should be balanced with the right of workers to stand outside 
of those agreements. 
 
Policies to address ride hailing under conditions of informality need to be evaluated in 
the context of emergent business models that have significant implications for workers’ 
rights and protections.  Policy makers need to consider how to balance community in-
novations with the previously discussed standards of decent work, and policy proposals 
need to take into consideration not only the situation of workers in “regular” platforms 
such as Uber and Cabify, but also the entrepreneurial spirit of workers in the emergent 
WhatsApp and “Sellos” networks.  Decent work standards should be designed such that 
they do not undermine entrepreneurship, while at the same time protecting against new 
forms of precarity for sub-contracted workers. Especially in emerging and developing 
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countries, attention should be fixed on the need to empower workers to be entrepreneurs 
and/or innovators and therefore to produce the conditions for their own welfare, while 
also protecting them from the extremes of economic abuses.  
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